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ASSESSING THE JOINT PUB 5-0 INTERPRETATION OF "CENTER OF GRAVITY": WILL IT HELP OR CONFUSE JOINT PLANNING?
War is a complex and violent art. So, it is understandable that the practitioners of warfare have desired a universal principle that guarantees success by simplifying some key aspect.
Would not some sort of 'silver bullet' be welcome, that when fired at the right place and time could lead to the opponent falling apart like a house of cards? This seems to have been the fuel behind the promotion of 'Center of Gravity' (CoG) as a key joint concept. Theoreticians, doctrine writers, and warfighters alike have over the last quarter century latched on to the various references to Center of Gravity in Clausewitz's famous work On War, believing the Prussian to have been on to something. Unfortunately, they produced a wide range of disparate interpretations and determination methods, some of which have been criticized as departing from Clausewitz's ideas. 1 Some theoreticians even question whether CoG is a relevant concept outside conventional warfare, such as in the War on Terror (WOT). Clausewitzian notion that the key to strategic success depends on applying effects to influence the adversary's greatest source of power, its "center of gravity," in order to achieve our mission and prevent the enemy from achieving his. Not only does the draft JP 5-0 assert that CoG is relevant to all operational environments including the WOT, it treats it as a critical step in the campaign planning process. Planners take as input a detailed system-of-systems analysis of the enemy, determine its center of gravity, then systematically analyze it in order to "produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose … to neutralize, weaken, or destroy it" without wasting precious resources. Theoretically, doing so "is the most direct path to mission accomplishment." 3 It sounds very promising.
Unfortunately, the description of CoGs in JP 5-0 and its accompanying literature on effects-based operations are likely to generate more controversy than resolution. Its view that
CoGs are multi-component entities of physical nodes and linking relationships is new and markedly different from previous interpretations of Clausewitz. JP 5-0 suggests that a force has one CoG with strategic and operational components, whereas many others saw distinct strategic and operational CoGs. Since the joint community has clearly settled on the definition in JP 5-0, to dismiss it as inconsistent with Clausewitz's original idea is unhelpful. Rather, we should ask whether or not this definition and its application in the planning process achieves what JP 5-0 purports. Are we confident that joint planners can readily derive this sort of CoG from a system-of-systems analysis of the enemy and apply it effectively in the planning process? Are we comfortable that the result will be a CoG that when weakened, destroyed, or neutralized, will directly achieve mission accomplishment? Or, are there seams within this process that could instead introduce confusion or lead to the wrong result? If so, can we mitigate them? If not, does this mean JP 5-0's construct is fundamentally flawed?
This paper begins with Clausewitz's original idea and some key points of contention predating the draft JP 5-0. It will then present JP 5-0's CoG definition to show how it addresses these issues. Next, it will evaluate JP 5-0's use of CoG in the planning process to identify pitfalls. Finally, it will offer recommendations to mitigate those pitfalls and suggest areas for further research.
Clausewitz, Conventional Warfare, and the Elusive Center Of Gravity
Clausewitz's famous work On War described his observations of the massed conventional warfare of his time, the early 19 th century. However, many of his ideas have survived to the present day because of the way he employed analogies of physics, engineering, political science, and other sciences to describe warfare's enduring strategic nature. A Clausewitzian is likely to believe that the tactics and tools of war may change, but the nature of war does not.
One aspect of this nature is the notion that belligerents have key capabilities or characteristics that provide its force with the will and power to act. Borrowing a term from physics, he called it the "center of gravity," and introduced it in a key passage of On War's Book Eight:
"What the theorist has to say is this: one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed." Unfortunately, Clausewitz passed away before he could finish his famous work, and inconsistencies in his use of the term among Books Six and Eight were left unresolved.
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Making matters worse, Howard and Paret translated two different German-language phrases in the manuscript (schwerpunkt and centra gravitates) as 'center of gravity' even though the meanings were clearly different. 6 This provided plenty of fodder for modern-era theoreticians and doctrine writers to develop their own independent interpretations, radically different from each other, yet claiming to derive from Clausewitz. 7 The following is a sampling of points of contention directly relevant to analysis of JP 5-0.
First is the question of 'one CoG or more than one.' Clausewitz's text, and indeed the meaning of the term 'center of gravity' from physics, 8 suggests that an enemy force has one and only one. 9 The only instance where Clausewitz permitted multiple centers of gravity is when a force is dealing with multiple enemies, and even then there is opportunity to conceptualize the multiple fronts as a single conflict. 12 "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity." 13 This passage suggested a point of great military strength. Yet, the following passage from
Book Eight shows how a CoG could be something else entirely:
"For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Frederick the Great, the center of gravity was their army. If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures. In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally the capital. … Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and of public opinion." 14 Considering the example of popular uprisings, friendly forces will not fear the heady blow of the uprising's "popular opinion." This interpretation led to a notion that strategic centers of gravity were political in nature while separate operational centers of gravity were the enemy's military centers of strength. 15 However, the fact that Clausewitz never explicitly argued for separate strategic and operational CoGs leads some to believe the latter does not really exist.
Indeed, his justification for Alexander's army is strategic in nature, and declaring a separate operational CoG would appear redundant or potentially contradictory. 16 The third question concerns how to determine a CoG and attack it. Clausewitz himself saw CoG determination as a matter of exercising the art of strategic judgment, and not subject to rational analysis or formula. 17 However, On War provided some useful hints that encouraged the pursuit of general-purpose determined methods. 34 This information helped fuel the whole operational planning process.
The strength of the generate-and-test approach was its flexibility. It was easier to take the rules-of-thumb employed by this approach and generalize them for new, unfamiliar situations.
On the other hand, it was much harder to adapt the rigid structures used by the bracketing approaches, and success was questionable.
Systems Theory, Effects-Based Approaches, and the New Center of Gravity in JP 5-0
In terms of the role of CoG determination in joint planning, JP 5-0 is clear. "One of the most important tasks confronting the Joint Force Commander's staff in the operational design process is the identification of friendly and adversary Centers of Gravity (CoGs). …The essence of the operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a CoG to neutralize, weaken, or destroy it. In theory, this is the most direct path to mission accomplishment." 35 It goes on to say that "this process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences." 36 Consequently, JP 5-0 embeds CoG determination and application fully in the joint planning process. In essence, it extends Strange's ideas. The analyst is given a defined set of inputs, including a full systems understanding of friendly and enemy forces. From this, the analyst derives the enemy's CoG, although the JP does not prescribe a specific determination method. The analyst then derives CCs, CRs, CVs, Decisive Points, Lines of Operation, and eventually a phased Course of Action that all relate back to the CoG. The outcome should identify actions that exploit the vulnerabilities to influence or coerce the enemy CoG to do our will. JP 5-0 also has the analyst identify the friendly center of gravity in order to protect it. On the surface, this is a very sound approach. It identifies a purpose for center of gravity determination and a logical set of inputs and outputs that ultimate contribute to the whole planning process.
That said, what does a JP 5-0 variety CoG look like? It is defined as "the set of capabilities, characteristics, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act." 37 It further defines a system as a "functionally related group of elements forming a complex whole," 38 candidates. 40 But, the depiction of CoGs as nodes in a network leads us uncomfortably toward bracketing methods with all its shortcomings. In order to assess this definitional construct fully, we must first take a closer look at the "system" the analyst would have to use.
Assessing the Inputs: Operational Net Assessment
This system is the output of a process called Operational Net Assessment (ONA), described in Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) Pamphlet 4. 41 This process translates intelligence gathered about a particular enemy 42 and encapsulates it into a description of the enemy's 'system' using PMESII as the foundation. This description uses a network-style model of nodes and links. Nodes are physical entities -individuals, groups, places, etc., while links represent relationships that can be behavioral, functional, or physical. 43 Analysts assign strength values to links to reflect levels of importance. 44 ONA databases are computer applications that analysts use to store and maintain information on nodes and links as new intelligence is gathered. 45 These databases are relational, which disciplines the process so data retrieval and analysis can be done reliably and consistently. 46 Application of the ONA includes the analysis of effects on the system, defined as "the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action or set of actions." 47 This approach purports to allow a friendly entity to model the enemy's adaptive behavior, such as how an enemy compensates for the successful production of effects by a friendly action.
Effects and counter-effects can include changes to the structure of the system, such as the addition or deletion of nodes and links, or to the nature or strength of relationships within the system. 48 From this, the analyst identifies that part of the system which meets the definition of a 59 Mitigating these problems requires close synchronization among all the agencies providing input to the ONA database, which will be challenging as these include non-Department of Defense entities. 60 Analysts must exercise discipline in encoding not only the nodes and links but how and why they were derived, facilitating re-examination of the enemy as more information becomes available and avoiding the pitfall of taking previous ONA information on faith.
The third challenge regards the limitation of nodes to describe only physical objects.
Many important 'things' about an enemy system are not physical objects at all, but humans routinely describe them as if they were tangible. This is called reification. 61 Some such objects could be "moral" CoG candidates, Critical Capabilities, or Critical Vulnerabilities. We tend to treat "national will" as different from the sum of the individual desires of the people. We lambaste "the media" for putting forth information or opinions that we might not like, even though those opinions only emanated from a couple of its individual members. 62 "Extremist ideologies"
are concepts drawn from human life and culture. The ideology can be put down on paper, but the ideas are themselves intangible. 63 Some societies or cultures attach a strong value to regional or international recognition of a culture's "identity". 64 People generally understand what these example terms mean, but their vagueness will cause individuals to interpret them differently. This introduces unwanted complexity and inconsistency in modeling organizational behavior. Consequently, modern social science treats reification as a problem and seeks ways to avoid it. 65 It is possibly also for this reason that the ONA process strictly defines nodes as physical entities, allowing for effects on them to be measurable.
Unfortunately, this restriction constrains both how ONA informs CoG analysis and how the results of effects-based operations feeds back to the ONA. The CoG analyst is looking for the sources of power that gives the system the will to act. "National will," "extremist ideologies," Some of these challenges bear themselves out in Figure 1 , an example enemy system provided in the Effects-Based Operations literature. This figure depicts a system where a terrorist cell receives funding through a corrupt central bank official skimming International
Monetary Fund (IMF) grants. The funding is funneled to other foreign sources toward the acquisition of weapons of mass effect (WME) materials, which the terrorist cell desires for use in asymmetric attacks on friendly bases. 69 While this is a simple figure to follow for learning ONA, it makes for a poor example of how it might help the CoG determination process.
First, it fails to depict control over the system. CoG analysis requires this information to determine the sources of moral and physical strength and freedom of action. 70 While we see what takes place and what each node contributes, we do not know who or what makes it act. 71 It also fails to describe which entities are passive players. For example, the authors likely wanted the reader to assume the central bank was neither involved nor even cognizant of the relationship between one of its employees and the terrorist cell. However, a different explanation exists where the bank was actually in control and using an employee as a pawn.
Second, the diagram is unhelpful in explaining 'why' the system exists and what keeps it together. What provides its will to act? 72 It could be an extremist ideology that drives hatred of friendly nations, a cultural identity that is under assault by foreign influence, or an economic threat brought about by friendly forward presence. Is this source of will universal in the system? Or, could ideology motivate the terrorist cell while the bank official merely acts on greed? The strength of will of each participant is also unknown. Analysts need this information to properly determine a CoG, as the answers may suggest that the CoG is moral and not physical. 
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Relationships among these interdependent systems help demonstrate control or lack thereof.
The example should also offer suggestions on how the system might adapt and self-correct in response to friendly action, informing effects-based operations later on.
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Assessing the New Definition of Center of Gravity
Even if the ONA is adjusted as suggested above, reliably deriving a CoG will still be difficult for two reasons. The first reason is that ONA does not offer information that helps analysts decide whether a CoG is multi-component or not, nor does it offer rules on how many components it may have. Taking JP 5-0's definition at its extreme, one could construct a CoG that consists of all viable candidate nodes and the links among them. Because the true CoG is likely included, neutralizing this larger 'CoG' would promote mission success but at a higher cost and greater risk. Narrowing the CoG to as few entities as possible is imperative. This requires clarity in the doctrine or in supplemental literature to guide analysts toward choosing the fewest nodes that collectively state the source of the system's moral and physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.
There is a corollary regarding the operational CoG, and the potential redundancy with the definition of a Critical Capability. While strategic and operational CoGs may overlap, 77 they will often be physically distinct entities. But, it is less clear whether or not the operational CoG will be truly a CoG, a capability or source of power from which the system derives its strength or will, or a Critical Capability, "a crucial enabler for the center of gravity to function. The good news is that JP 5-0's definition is not military-centric, and therefore could be readily adapted for interagency use. A CoG is the source of power for a whole system and not merely one component of it, such as the military. Hence, at the interagency level, the elements of power should be able to agree on the CoG and establish unity of effort in developing ways and means to apply against it. The joint commander is given the strategic CoG from above and seeks options for applying military means against it at the appropriate time.
With these adjustments made, the question remains whether or not one can expect that neutralization or destruction of a JP 5-0 CoG leads to mission accomplishment. We cannot answer 'yes,' because there are so many other factors such as friction 82 that will come into play.
However, there is nothing that suggests a definitive 'no.' We are theoretically targeting that which holds the whole enemy system together and gives it its strength and will. We are approaching it holistically by applying all elements of power against it, rather than onedimensionally with military force. We may not succeed in making the enemy's system fall like a house of cards, but we may knock it off-balance enough to disrupt its control mechanism, diffuse its ideology, or constrain its actions. 83 Consequently, JP 5-0's definition of CoG should be considered generally acceptable.
Toward a New CoG Determination Method
How then does one go about determining a JP 5-0 CoG? While a detailed proposal for a new or updated determination method is beyond the scope of this paper, there are principles that this method should incorporate. Overall, the method should stick with the generate-andtest approach. The bracketing approach of whittling away at the enemy system until only the CoG remains would be just as inefficient and ineffective against a node-link model as it was in other constructs. The ONA process lends itself to rapid generation of viable CoG candidates.
The inputs to CoG determination must include both physical and moral entities. ONA currently provides physical nodes, but it or some other process should overlay notions of control, motivation, and other intangible or moral entities.
The method should provide guidelines on how to tell when a moral entity is indeed separate from the physical object with which it may be associated. For example, at what point is the "will of the people" separate from the people in the system? When does an ideology cease to be simply an idea in an extremist's mind and take on a life of its own? For CoG determination, such information helps identify the priority for friendly effects. Even if moral entities are not found to be the CoG, they can still potentially serve as Critical Capabilities, Critical Requirements, and especially Critical Vulnerabilities. The method must foster the ability to reduce the CoG to the fewest entities possible. If the CoG candidate is a physical entity, such as a military unit or governing body, the analyst should ensure that no sub-element is also a CoG candidate. If moral, then the analyst should narrow that candidate's focus to see if it is a better candidate. For example, is it generically the "will of the people" or is it specifically the "will of the people to achieve a particular objective?"
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As JP 5-0 permits multi-component CoGs, the method must include insights as to when, why, and how this occurs. It must also help rule out when one of those components is no more than a Critical Capability for the other.
Finally, there should be ways of validating the results. The planning process offers two potential approaches. The first is a reverse-engineering approach on the ONA. After analysts have applied a test to determine the best CoG candidate, they can superimpose that CoG on the ONA to verify that it logically and singularly controls and motivates the system. If the ONA shows that neutralization or destruction of the CoG would defeat the system, then it is more likely that the correct CoG has been found. The second approach is directed forward. As planners derive the necessary effects to meet friendly strategic objectives, they can verify whether or not those effects as applied against the CoG provide a clear path to mission accomplishment. The merits of either approach clearly require further study, but a validation process would be a tremendous tool for planners.
Conclusions and Areas of Further Study
The emerging Joint Pub 5-0 offers a tantalizing new look at an old problem. The importance placed on center of gravity determination in joint operations is well-founded. The emerging JP 5-0 provides an excellent foundation for focusing the planning effort on those aspects of the enemy that we most want to influence. However, the job is not finalized. The center of gravity is the point at the center of an object's weight distribution where the force of gravity acts," and "that point where an object balances perfectly." 22 Echevarria, note 40, assails both methods as ineffective and wasteful of resources. 23 For example, Giles and Galvin, 12, states that CoG candidates must satisfy the following heuristic, or rule-of-thumb, derived from Clausewitz: "Can imposing your will (destroy, defeat, delay) on the potential center of gravity candidate create the deteriorating effect that prevents your foe from achieving his aims and allows the achievement of yours… and will it be decisive?" Readers must make a subjective yes/no assessment. The assumption is if the CoG candidates were properly derived, then only one candidate best meets this rule. 26 Echevarria, 19 . Emphasis original. 27 Echevarria questionned whether the CoG concept applied to all forms of conflict. Drawing from Clausewitz, he suggests on page 15 that "we should look for CoGs only in war designed to defeat the enemy completely" because in those cases "military and political objectives … complement one another," whereas they do not when the political objectives of the war are more limited. In that case, simply propagating political strategic objectives to operational and tactical objectives would suffice. 28 Echevarria, 19 , stressed that the CoG concept "did not apply in a situation in which the enemy is not connected enough to act with unity." On this point, I respectfully disagree. Even if the glue holding the system together is weak, there still is a system, and it is possible that the system has been inadequately defined by the planner to encompass all aspects, including external, that describe how it holds together and runs. 29 Ibid., 16-18. 30 Ibid., 17-18. It is also worthy to note Echevarria's point that the CoG is not necessarily the greatest source of strength. On page 11, he uses Clausewitz's own example from the PrussianAustrian campaign of 1814 against France. While Prussia's forces were greater in numbers, it was the Austrian leader that glued the alliance together. 31 Strange, 43. 32 Ibid., 44-46. Strange identifies two classes of CoGs -moral and physical. He offers two varieties of moral CoG that I would describe as individual, such as the power and influence of a national leader, and collective, such as the belief in a cause or will of the people. He offers three categories of physical CoG --some aspect of the military or economic elements of 48 From Commander's Handbook, 18. "The aim is to take those actions that create the desired operational and strategic effects (while avoiding the undesired effects) within the operational environment. This approach demands a comprehensive understanding of the links between nodes and systems to anticipate the likely behavior of the adversary system and its impact on friendly systems and the remaining environment." 49 JP 5-0, IV-10. 50 Ibid., IV-10-11. In the context of CoG, JP 5-0 stresses that the CoG can change during the course of conflict based on the emergence of new capabilities, etc. Consequently, continuous validation of the CoG is important. 51 Commander's Handbook, 18-19. 52 JWFC Pamphlet 4, 7-8. The Introduction section of the ONA Concept chapter acknowledges that ONA seeks to improve knowledge of the enemy, but it implies that total knowledge of the enemy is neither achievable nor promised by this process. 53 Theoretically, any collective node could require subdivision into component parts if they contribute materially to the system. 54 JWFC Pamphlet, 21, makes a point that the ONA does not replace the existing intelligence processes. Instead, it facilitates the operational planning process by organizing the data necessary to foster a system-of-systems analysis. It also cites as a concern the ability to man systems-of-systems analysts whose roles would be separate from intelligence analysts. Naturally, this almost requires limits be imposed on an ONA database in order to priority intelligence collection efforts. 58 This is an example of what is described in Berard, 197, as a 'micro-macro' conflict between the specific practices executed among lower echelons of organizations against the structural norms established at the upper echelons. 59 Relationship permanency is just one aspect of modeling the temporal/spatial aspects of a database entry. Nodes and links can gain or lose attributes according to time intervals. In 73 There is a technical issue with this figure as well. Database engineers refer to this as the 'parent-child' problem, where both a collective entity and one of its individual members are depicted as equals. In the case of the figure, the corrupted 'Bank Official' is diagrammed as a separate entity from the 'Central Bank.' The link connecting the two is unnamed, but it is assumed by the reader to reflect the movement of funding as that is the named input link to the Central Bank. In a proper relational construct, Bank Official would be linked to Central Bank as an employee, a child node of the Central Bank. Otherwise, another reader of the figure could mistakenly assume that actions affecting the Central Bank do not automatically perform an effect on the bank employee. Although the actual ONA database underlying this diagram probably would encode this relationship properly, it is easy to see how an untrained database technician would overlook this inconsistency, especially given the heterogeneity of the nodes in the diagram. Ramez Elmasri and Shamkant B. Navathe, Fundamentals of Database Systems (Redwood City, CA: The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, Inc., 1989), 254-264, gives a technical overview of hierarchical database structures, including integrity constraints that address problems such as the above. 74 Commander's Handbook, 17. Figure II-3 . As a general comment of the depiction of a system-of-system's analysis of a terrorist group seeking WMD, this figure is awful and ought to be replaced. Beyond the problems identified in the text, this figure does not delineate the different PMESII subsystems, so the reader is left unable to visualize how a system-of-systems analysis would have derived a figure such as the one drawn. A second serious problem is the out-of-nowhere depiction of critical links to "Interdict" without the CoG analysis and enemy courses of action having been studied (these being outside the scope of the figure). As this is a component of an effects-based approach, the friendly actions depicted should at least acknowledge the CoG and the desired state of the system. 75 JP 5-0, IV-9. 76 A final comment on JP 5-0 regards the emergence of a potential redundancy between the operational CoG and Critical Capabilities that fall within the military subsystem. JP 5-0, IV-12, states the operational CoG "resides in the military system" and overlaps with the strategic CoG which focuses in the political system. Meanwhile, JP 5-0, IV-13, defines a Critical Capability as "a capability that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such, and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s)." It should therefore be inferred that an operational CoG can be a Critical Capability for a strategic CoG, even though they overlap.
In the case where the strategic CoG is a military force, this is not a problem. Clausewitz's example of Frederick the Great's Army being the center of gravity is such an example. Under the JP 5-0 construct, the strongest components of that Army would likely be Critical Capabilities.
However, when distinct entities, an operational CoG has a second role as Critical Capability for the strategic CoG, and this can create confusion. Desert Storm offers an example. Keppler, page 7, and Dale Eikmeier, in "The Center of Gravity Debate Resolved," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies, 16 December 1998), both derived the Strategic CoG having been Saddam Hussein and his inner circle of the Ba'ath Party and the operational CoG having been the Republican Guard. Both argued forcefully that the Republican Guard was not the strategic CoG for Iraq, however the JP 5-0 construct requires that the Republican Guard is a connected part of the CoG subsystem. In this instance, planners would identify the Republican Guard as a CC of the strategic CoG and as the operational CoG separately with its own range of CCs.
A third case that could occur involves the lack of an operational CoG, which is entirely possible if the adversary is not relying on military forces to achieve its objectives. Such an instance is highlighted in Bennett's study on the war on drugs, where the enemy strategic CoG is friendly demand and its elements of power do not necessarily include traditional military forces. In this case, the equivalent of an operational CoG might reside in another PMESII system, perhaps economic or infrastructural that facilitates the distribution of drugs to users in friendly territory. This begs the notion that operational CoG equivalents could be defined for diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of power. [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . Tomlin describes center of gravity as a concept of grand strategy, and that some contemporary interpretations of CoG were too narrow and fixated on the force-on-force land-centric aspects of the concept. "The main effort of On War is directed at the higher plane of the politics that brings us to war in the first place. … Accordingly, the strategic Center of Gravity needs to be the sole property of the strategic leadership of the nation at war." 80 For example, information about the political wing of the military leadership would more likely come from intelligence sources and not through mil-to-mil contacts.
temptation of assuming that the lack of strategic effect necessarily means that the wrong CoG was targeted.
